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How can countries stimulate and sustain strong export 
growth? To answer this question, the authors examine 
92 episodes of export surges, defined as significant 
increases in manufacturing export growth that are 
sustained for at least seven years. They find that export 
surges in developing countries tend to be preceded by a 
large real depreciation—which leaves the exchange rate 
significantly undervalued—and a reduction in exchange 
rate volatility. In contrast, in developed countries, the 
role of the exchange rate is less pronounced. The authors 
examine why the exchange rate is so important in 
This paper—a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group, and the Trade Department, Poverty Reduction 
and Economic Management Network—is part of a larger effort in the departments to understand competitiveness. Policy 
Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at 
cfreund@worldbank.org.  
developing countries and find that the depreciation leads 
to a significant reallocation of resources in the export 
sector. In particular, depreciation generates more entries 
into new export products and new markets, and the 
percentage of new entries that fail after one year declines.  
These new products and new markets are important, 
accounting for 25 percent of export growth during the 
surge in developing countries. The authors argue that 
maintaining a competitive currency leads firms to expand 
the product and market space for exports, inducing a 
large reorientation of the tradable sector.   
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The motivation for this study is to understand how developing countries can stimulate 
and sustain strong export growth.  Export growth is important for a number of reasons.  
First, it can generate income growth when domestic demand lags.  This is especially 
important in small economies, where foreign markets are likely to be the main engines 
for growth (Bhagwati 1996, Krueger 1998).  Second, robust export growth yields both 
more jobs and better jobs.  Manufacturing exports are typically labor intensive, so the 
demand for labor rises with them.  Exporting firms also create jobs that pay higher wages 
and offer better working conditions than otherwise similar import-competing firms.
1  
Third, strong export growth tends to induce a more efficient production structure.  This 
happens through compositional shifts, as the most productive exporting firms tend to 
grow most rapidly when exports boom.
2  Finally, strong export growth helps prevent 
balance of payments crises.  While many studies have examined the effect of openness on 
growth and productivity,
3 our focus is different—it is on how exports take-off.   
The advantage of exploring export surges is that their dynamics may provide 
insight into how export-led growth begins.  For example, if export expansions are the 
result of domestic productivity shocks, we should see an increase in investment and GDP 
before the surge.  In this case, export-led growth is a misnomer in the sense that the 
expansion is domestically driven and exports simply follow a productivity shock.  If, on 
the other hand, export expansions are the result of trade liberalization or real exchange 
                                                 
1 Bernard and Jensen (1995) report detailed statistics for the United States.  A number of papers followed 
their approach and find similar results in both developing and developed economies.  Shank, Schnabel and 
Wagner (2007) provide a summary of these papers in Appendix A, and offer similar evidence for Germany. 
Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2008) also provide a summary. 
2 See Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2008) for a summary of the literature. 
3 See Winters (2004) for a summary of the literature on trade and growth. 
  2rate movements that make domestic exports more competitive, then we should observe 
changes in these variables before the expansion.   
We identify and examine 92 episodes of export surges.  An export surge is 
defined as a significant and sustained increase in manufacturing export growth from one 
7-year period to the next 7-year period.  We focus on manufactures for two reasons.  
First, expansion in the manufacturing sector has been associated with strong growth in 
developing countries (Jones and Olken 2008 and Johnson, Ostry, and Subramanian 
2006).  Second, we want to avoid surges due to commodity price booms.  We use data for 
both developing and developed countries in order to distinguish whether there is a 
fundamental difference between surges in the two types of countries.  We examine 
movements in trade policy and macro variables, such as the exchange rate, GDP growth, 
savings, investment, foreign demand, and consumption before and after the surges begin.  
We also examine the type of countries that have surges and the reorientation of exports 
during the surge.  
We identify four important characteristics of export surges.  First, surges are more 
likely in open economies or economies that are liberalizing.  Second, surges are preceded 
by a large depreciation of the real exchange rate and lower exchange rate volatility.  
Third, in developing countries, the real depreciation is large enough so as to leave the 
exchange rate undervalued by 20 percent on average.  And fourth, the extensive 
margin—the discovery of new products and new markets—is important for export surges 
in developing countries, accounting for 25 percent of total manufacturing exports growth 
in the 7 years of the surge.   
  3The dominance of the real exchange rate in stimulating export surges is striking, 
especially given the modest effects of exchange rates on exports typically found in the 
literature.
4,5  Only in a few cases have exchanges rates been identified as important factor 
stimulating export growth.  A number of recent papers discuss the link between exchange 
rate undervaluation and export growth for China (Dooley et al. 2004 and Eichengreen 
2008), though Ahearne et. al. (2006) find that external demand is far more important.  
Arslan and van Wijnbergen (1993) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) highlight links 
between exchange rate depreciation and export booms in Turkey and the United States, 
respectively.  Bayoumi (1999) finds sizable exchange rate elasticities of trade for 
industrial countries. 
The strong relationship between the exchange rate and export surges is, however, 
consistent with recent work on the exchange rate and income growth.  Hausmann, 
Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) find that exchange rate depreciation is an important part of 
growth accelerations, and Rodrik (2007) shows that undervaluation leads to income 
growth in developing countries.  Rodrik (2007) argues that undervaluation can be welfare 
improving, a kind of second best policy, if there is a market failure that affects the 
tradables sector more than the nontradables sector.
6  Consistent with this idea, there is 
evidence that tradables are relatively more important for growth.  Jones and Olken (2008) 
and Johnson, Ostry, and Subramanian (2006) find that a reorientation of production 
                                                 
4 In the postwar period, the term “exchange rate pessimism” was coined to describe the low exchange rate 
elasticities of trade typically found in the literature (see Obstfeld 2002 for a discussion).  More generally, 
the absence of a link between exchange rates and economic fundamentals has been dubbed the “exchange 
rate disconnect puzzle”.  In recent work, Colacelli (2006) finds small elasticities in developing countries. 
Likewise, Fang, Lai, and Miller (2006) find that in seven Asian countries the effects of depreciation on 
exports are small and in Singapore are non-existent.   
5 There is also a large literature on the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade flows.  While that 
literature finds small effects, the literature on currency unions tends to find very large effects, suggesting 
volatility is important.  See Baldwin et. Al. (2005) for a discussion. 
6 He focuses on information and coordination problems and contractual complexity. 
  4towards manufactures (tradables) is correlated with high growth in developing countries.  
Eichengreen (2008), however, points out that an important weakness of this literature is 
that “the nature of the externality remains obscure”. 
An important contribution of this paper is to understand how the exchange rate 
stimulates exports in developing countries and whether the channel is consistent with 
some type of externality or market failure.  To do this we focus on the implications of 
new trade theory for how exports grow.  Krugman (1981) shows that in a model with 
intra-industry trade, larger economies trade more because they export more products.  
Hummels and Klenow (2005) examine this empirically using a large cross section of 
countries and find strong support for these types of models.   Studies using time-series 
data, however, find a smaller contribution of the extensive margin (trade in new products 
and to new markets) in explaining export growth.
7  A large real depreciation should 
stimulate both the intensive and the extensive margins, as it lowers the cost to foreign 
consumers of varieties already sold abroad while increasing returns from exporting to 
new markets or exporting new products.  
To examine the mechanics of the export surge, we examine entry into new export 
industries and new export markets, and the failure rate of these entries from the time the 
depreciation begins through the surge.  We find that the change in relative prices leads to 
entry in new export industries and the discovery of new markets.  Equally important, the 
undervalued exchange rate makes it easier to succeed in these new products and markets.  
On average, entry levels in developing countries increase by about 75 percent during the 
export surge from levels five years before.  The new products and new markets are 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Besedes and Prusa (2007) and Amurgo-Pacheco and Pierola (2008). Part of the 
discrepancy may also be due to difference in calculating the extensive margin, whether it is from year to 
year or over a longer period, and the weights that are used to calculate the contribution of each margin. 
  5important, accounting for 17 percent of total exports at the end of the surge, and 25 
percent of export growth, in developing countries.  The importance of the exchange rate 
for the extensive margin in developing countries is confirmed using regression analysis 
for the full sample of annual data from 1980-2006.   
These results are consistent with a distortion that disproportionately affects the 
tradables sector and offers insight into the nature of the distortion.  The large real 
exchange rate depreciation facilitates a reorientation of production towards the most 
efficient manufacturing industries in developing countries.  While the product and market 
space is well explored in developed markets; there is ample room for expansion along 
both dimensions in developing countries.  We find that in developing countries the extent 
of depreciation and the importance of new export markets and new export products are 
much larger than in developed countries.  Moreover, only in developing countries is 
undervaluation an important part of the surge.  This is suggestive of a market failure that 
leads to suboptimal entry in new products and new markets at the “equilibrium” 
exchange rate.  Undervaluation—or, put another way, a competitive currency—is the big 
push that encourages both more entries and more successes.   It performs like a “grand 
opening sale”, and once customers start coming many of the new relationships are 
maintained even after the sale is over.   
  The paper is organized as follows:  The next section defines export surges and 
describes the data.  Section III examines the relationship between export surges, GDP 
surges, and export collapses, to look for cyclical effects.  Section IV looks at the 
conditions that lead to an episode.  Section V focuses on the composition of the export 
  6surge.  Section VI examines sustained and unsustained episodes.  Section VII discusses 
country cases. And Section VIII concludes. 
 
 
II.  Identification of surges 
Following Freund (2005) on current account reversals and Hausmann, Pritchett, and 
Rodrik (2005) on growth accelerations, we use a filter to identify episodes of export 
surges that are supply driven.  Specifically, a surge must satisfy the following criteria: 
 
a)  Real average export growth over 7 years is above 6 percent. 
 
b)  Real average 7-year export growth increases by one third from the previous 7-
year average and is at least 3 percentage points above the previous 7-year average. 
 
c)  The average 7-year import share of the exporter in its three five markets is greater 
than in the previous 7-year period. 
 
d)  The minimum level of exports observed during each of the 7 years following a 
surge is higher than the maximum level of exports during each of the 7 years 
before the surge starts. 
 
e)  Average growth during the surge, excluding the strongest year of growth, is 
greater than average growth before the surge. 
 
 
Condition (a) ensures that export growth is strong and above the world average for a 
surge.  Condition (b) ensures that growth increased significantly from the previous seven-
year period—i.e. it is not just trend.   Condition (c) ensures that the episode is supply 
driven, as opposed to a demand increase in a country’s largest trade partners. Condition 
(d) ensures that exports are higher in the post surge period and prevents against volatility 
driven surges.  And condition (e) excludes surges that are due to one year of very strong 
growth.   
  7We only consider those periods where we have a full set of observations; i.e. we 
have information for each of the seven years before and after the surge starts. We took 7 
years as the relevant time horizon, as in Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005), 
however, for robustness purposes we also calculate results for 5-year periods and find the 
results very similar, and in Section V1, we discuss results for episodes that are sustained 
for 12-years.  
To identify the surges, we use export data from COMTRADE covering the period 
from 1980 to 2005.
8 Also, since our objective is to focus on what happens in the 
manufacturing sector, we use the trade data reported under the SITC Rev. 2 classification 
(Chapters 5 to 8).
9  Appendix Table A1 describes all of the data used in the analysis in 
more detail. 
After applying the criteria mentioned above, we obtain 92 episodes of export 
surges. The full list of episodes by country including the year when the surge starts can 
be found in Appendix Table A2.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average and median values of real 
manufacturing exports for developing and developed countries before and after the year 
when the surge starts (year 0) in the upper panel, and manufacturing export growth in the 
lower panel.  For both developing and developed economies, the level and growth of 
manufacturing exports increases significantly after the surge starts.   Figure 2, shows the 
rise of manufacturing exports during the surge, both as a percent of GDP and as a percent 
                                                 
8 In order to reduce the number of missing observations, we have used mirror data (imports) from all 
countries.  Because of noise in the data, we eliminate countries with annual trade below $1,000,000 during 
the period. 
9 These chapters include all manufactured goods classified by materials, chemicals, miscellaneous 
manufactures and machinery and transport equipment. Also, we alternatively used the manufactured goods 
reported under the ISIC classification, chapters 31 to 39, and we obtained nearly identical results. 
  8of total merchandise exports.  These figures demonstrate a significant move toward 
manufacturing exports. 
Figure 3 shows income growth, real consumption, and unemployment.  Export 
surges are associated with relatively high GDP growth, especially during the surge, real 
per capita consumption expenditure increases, and unemployment shows some decline in 
over the period.
10  Export surges are welfare enhancing.    
 
 
III.  The relationship between export surges, GDP surges, and export collapses 
In this section, we analyze the relationship between export surges and GDP surges in 
order to assess whether the episodes identified in the first part correspond to periods of 
pure export growth or whether the surges are a result of the overall performance of the 
economy. For that purpose, we define GDP surges using similar criteria as those utilized 
to identify export surges episodes; however, in the case of GDP surges, taking into 
account that 6 percent could be considered very high for GDP growth (GDP growth rates 
tend to be lower than export growth rates), we used 3.5 percent as the cutoff value for the 
condition imposed on the average rate over the 7-year period. 
As a result, we obtained 71 episodes of GDP surges. Table 1 shows the results 
from the comparison of the timing of GDP surges and export surges for those countries 
that experienced both episodes within a period of 8 years.  We find that an export surge 
episode is close in time to a GDP surge episode in 33 cases. In most of them, the export 
surge happens before or at the same time as the GDP surge starts.  Almost two-thirds of 
the export surge episodes happen within periods where there is no GDP surge or if there 
                                                 
10 One caveat is that the unemployment data is limited with only 14 observations in developed countries 
and 14 in industrial.  In all graphs we use a balanced sample to avoid changes due to entry or exit (see 
Table A4). 
  9is, it is far enough in time distance so as to consider them completely separate events.  
Although we are not formally testing causality, this evidence supports the fact that the 
export surges identified are not a consequence of an economic boom. 
Likewise, in order to evaluate whether the export surge episodes reflect a cyclical 
component (ie. recovery from a previous collapse or a boom before a collapse); we 
compared the timing of the export surges to the timing of the export collapses.
11  We 
obtain only 14 episodes of export collapses (listed in Appendix Table A3), indicating that 
collapse is a much rarer event. If we compare collapses and surges, we find that three 
countries have had both a surge and a collapse.  These are Bahamas, Congo, and 
Lebanon.  However, following the same criteria as in the previous comparison between 
export surges and GDP—a maximum time distance of 8 years in between—surges and 
collapses occur together in only one case.   This is the Bahamas, where the surges 
preceded the collapse by 8 years.  In the other two cases, the export collapses were the 
consequence of unrest in the countries.  
 
IV.  What conditions precede an episode? 
In this section, we examine the similarities in the economies in the years leading up to the 
surge.  We look at the trade policy stance and the movement in various macro variables, 
such as the real exchange rate, savings and investment. 
                                                 
11 For that purpose, we defined export collapses in a similar way to export surges:  
a)  Real average export growth over 7 years is below zero and real average 7-year export growth 
decreases by one third from the previous 7 year average. 
b)  Real average 7-year export growth is at least 3 percentage points below the previous 7-year 
average. 
c)  The average 7-year share of the exporter in its five top markets is smaller than in the previous 7-
year period. 
d)  The maximum level of exports observed during each of the 7 years following a collapse is below 
the minimum level of exports observed during each of the 7 years before the collapse starts. 
  10  
Trade liberalization 
We use the Sachs and Warner (1995) data on the date of trade liberalizations, as updated 
by Wacziarg and Welch (2008), to determine the relationship between liberalization and 
export surges.  Of our 92 episodes that take place in 82 countries, they have information 
on openness for 65 countries. 
Sachs and Warner (1995) and Wacziarg and Welch (2008) construct a dummy 
variable for openness based on five specific trade-related policies. A country is classified 
as closed if it displayed at least one of the following characteristics: (a) an average tariff 
rates of 40 percent of more (TAR); (b) nontariff barriers covering 40 percent or more of 
trade (NTB); (c) a black market exchange rate that is depreciated by 20 percent or more 
relative to the official exchange rate (BMP); (d) A state monopoly on major exports 
(XMB); and (e) a socialist economic system (as defined by Kornai, 1992) (SOC). 
Using these criteria, they classify the date of openness as the first year when none 
of these policies is in place.  We compare the dates of the export surges with the dates of 
the liberalizations.  Table 2 reports the results.  We find that surges are more likely in 
open economies (36 percent of observations), or within five years of liberalizations (40 
percent of observations).  In 7 percent of the observations, the liberalization year and the 
episode year are identical, and they are within one year of each other in an additional 4 
percent of observations. 
While this is suggestive that openness is important for surges, a concern is that by 
the end of the period most countries are open, so perhaps liberalization in the surge 
countries simply reflects global trends.  Table 3 compares openness between the 
  11countries with surges and the countries without surges.  It shows that at the beginning of 
the period, three-quarters of the countries in the surge sample and the no-surge sample 
were closed.  However, at the end of the period, only 18 percent of the surge countries 
were closed, as compared with 34 percent of the non-surge countries.  The t-test of the 
difference between the means at the beginning of the sample is not significant.  At the 
end of the sample, it is significant at the 5 percent level, implying that countries in the 
surge sample are significantly more likely to have liberalized than countries in the non-
surge sample.   
One criticism that has been leveled at this measure is that it tends to pick up 
exchange rate management and/or state ownership more than trade liberalization (see 
discussion in Wacziarg and Welch 2008).  An alternative way to examine trade policy 
more directly is to look at average tariffs during the surge.  Figure 4 shows the average 
tariff around the time of the surge.
12  There is a general trend towards liberalization, 
especially in developing countries, over the period.  However, liberalization immediately 
before the surge tends to be modest (2-4 percentage points) and there is little evidence of 
a discrete jump. 
 
Time series view of macro variables 
 
In this section, we examine how various macro variables change before and during the 
surge.  As above, all of the graphs are shown for a balanced sample to ensure that 
                                                 
12 The tariff data are from the World Bank, Trade Research Division ,“Trends in average applied tariff rates 
in developing and industrial countries, 1981-2007” (http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL 
/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:21051044~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:4
69382,00.html). The data are compiled from UNCTAD, IMF, WTO, and country sources.  The graph 
shows the unweighted overall annual average applied tariff rates.  
  12movements reflect within country changes and not the addition or subtraction of 
particular observations.
13   
 
The exchange rate 
We first look at the real exchange rate.  Figure 5 shows movements in the real exchange 
rate, exchange rate misalignment, and volatility.  Export surges are preceded by a 
significant currency depreciation, especially in the case of developing countries where we 
observe that, on average, there is a depreciation of about 30 percent before the surge. 
How does the depreciation leave the exchange rate relative to its equilibrium 
level?  To answer this question we estimate exchange rate misalignment adjusting for the 
Balasa-Samuelson effect.  Specifically, using data from the Penn World Tables, we 
regress the real exchange rate at PPP on real per-capita GDP and calendar-year fixed 
effects, and the extent of misalignment is measured as the difference between the log of 
the real exchange rate at PPP and the log of the fitted value from the regression (as in 
Frankel 2006, Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii 2007, and Rodrik 2007).  The middle panel of 
Figure 5 shows misalignment.  In developing countries a move toward undervaluation 
tends to precede surges.  At the onset of the surge, the exchange rate tends to be about 10 
percent undervalued and by the end of the surge it is about 20 percent undervalued. 
Exchange rate volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the monthly 
nominal rate as recorded in the IFS IMF Statistics.  As shown in Figure 5, it declines 
before the surge, especially in developing countries.  Together these graphs suggest that a 
steady and large real depreciation stimulates the export surge. 
                                                 
13 Table A4 lists the number of countries with data for all of the relevant years for each variable, which are 
included in each of the graphs. 
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Savings and investment 
 
One channel that has been proposed for the transmission of the real exchange rate to 
income growth is through savings and investment, with a more depreciated rate leading to 
higher savings, investment, and income growth.
14  The savings rate rises during the boom 
(Figure 6).  However, we do not find that the domestic investment rate increases.  Rather, 
increased savings results in a boost to the current account position, as predicted by the 
well-known model of Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004).  In their model, 
increased savings are invested abroad because of better financial intermediation in the 
foreign economy.  The fact that investment growth does not precede the surge also 
suggests that the surge is not a result of a productivity shock. 
Foreign investment may also respond to the depreciation, since domestic assets 
will be cheaper for external investors.  While there is evidence of an increased ratio of 
FDI to GDP, in constant dollars it looks more like a trend increase over the period, 
especially in developing countries (Figure 7).  Moreover, if we look at countries with 
large depreciations (above the median), as compared with those with small depreciations, 
we do not see a sharper increase in foreign direct investment in the countries with more 
depreciation.  
 
Foreign demand effects  
In order to evaluate whether the surge is a result of increased foreign demand, we look at 
the top five markets of each country and examine their total imports and import growth 
                                                 
14  In a recent cross-country study, Montiel and Serven (2008) find no evidence of an exchange-rate related 
savings channel in stimulating income growth. 
  14from the rest of the world.
15   Our focus is supply driven export surges, and condition (c), 
that market share abroad increases, makes this unlikely.  Still it could be the case that 
both supply and demand forces are at work.    If import growth from the rest of the world 
increases dramatically during the surge then foreign income growth or foreign 
liberalization may be an important part of the story.  Figure 8 shows average and median 
total imports and import growth from the rest of the world.  For both developing and 
developed countries there is some evidence of higher import growth especially in the first 
year of the surge, but growth is very volatile.  In addition, for developing countries 
import growth slows markedly as the surge progresses.  This suggests that import demand 
is not a major factor for maintaining surges in developing countries.  
In sum, the exchange rate displays the clearest and strongest relationship with the 
export surge, especially in developing countries.  On average, a 30 percent real 
depreciation precedes export surges in developing countries.  Sizeable undervaluation 
and reduced volatility also accompany the surge. 
 
V.  Composition 
The purpose of this section is to understand how the real depreciation influences trade 
patterns using disaggregated 4-digit SITC (Rev. 2) bilateral trade data.  The large real 
depreciation of the exchange rate has three potential effects.  First, it makes existing 
domestic goods cheaper abroad, increasing demand for them.  This is the standard effect.  
Second, it makes entries into new markets or new export products more profitable, which 
would generate more entries.  And third, for a given level of entries, it reduces the 
                                                 
15 The top 5 markets for each exporting country were identified by calculating the share of each importing 
country (destination market) in the exporting country’s total trade during the period between 1985 and 2006 
and selecting the five markets with the highest share throughout this period. 
  15likelihood of finding a new market or product unprofitable and exiting.  Thus, the failure 
rate associated with entry would fall.   
To explore how important these channels are, we define an entry as an export 
observation in a product line that was not exported in the previous year or as a new 
market for an existing product.  A failure is defined as entry that exists for just one year, 
i.e. a new market/product was tried in year t, but it is unsuccessful and does not appear in 
year t+1.  In order to avoid entries as a result of countries that begin reporting imports 
during the period—recall, we use mirror data—we use a balanced sample of 43 importers 
that report trade continuously from 1980 to 2005.  These countries account for on average 
82 percent of total manufacturing trade of the 182 exporters over the period.  Using a 
balanced sample implies that we are likely to underestimate the importance of new 
markets, since some destinations are left out, though the importance of these markets is 
likely to be small in most cases, as these are small countries.   
Figure 9 shows the median number of entries and median misalignment for 
developing and developed countries (graphs using means look similar).  The extent of 
undervaluation is positively correlated with an increasing number of entries.  Figure 10 
shows the median misalignment and the median failure rate in developing and developed 
countries.   The failure rate appears to be declining in the misalignment.  This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that undervaluation generates a significant amount of entry 
and a lower failure rate.  It is noteworthy that the failure rate is quite high, well over 50 
percent.  This is consistent with work by Besedes and Prusa (2007) that shows that entry 
is frequent, it is the duration of new exports that separates successful exporters, such as 
the countries of East Asia, with unsuccessful exporters.   
  16To determine if this is an effect of the undervalued exchange rate, we split the 
developing country sample into countries with more depreciation (above the median 
change during the surge) and less depreciation (below the median).  We find that entries 
increase more in the countries with greater changes in misalignment (Figure 11).  We 
also find that the failure rate falls by more (Figure 12).  These effects are stronger in 
developing countries. 
But are these new entries important?  Figure 13 shows the cumulative share of 
new products and new markets in total exports.  Products are considered new if they were 
not exported in year -4,-5, or -6 relative to the surge.  We use three years to avoid picking 
re-entries as new entry, this is important for products where demand may vary from year 
to year.  Note that this is a conservative estimate of the extensive margin, if we use just 
one year as the base we get larger results.  In developing countries, new products and new 
markets are worth about 17 percent of exports by the end of the surge and 25 percent of 
export growth.  In developed countries, where nearly all of the entry is in new markets, 
entries make up 8 percent of total exports by the end of the sample.  The smaller impact 
is because developed countries have previously expanded to most of the key markets in 
their main products.   
As an alternative way of looking at restructuring in the manufacturing export 
sector, we calculate an index of revealed comparative advantage before the surge begins 
(years -6 to -4), and see what happens to these industries over time.
16  Figure 14 shows 
the share of these initial revealed comparative advantage (IRCA) industries in total 
                                                 
16 The Revealed Comparative Advantage Index (RCA) was calculated by taking the share of product “i” in 
in the total trade of country “j” from years -6 to -4 and dividing that by the share of product “i” in  the total 
World’s trade during the same period. The IRCA industries include all those products with an RCA larger 
or equal to one. 
  17manufacturing exports for more and less undervalued currencies.  The decline of the 
IRCA industries is starker among episodes with more depreciation in both developing 
and developed countries, implying that resources are moving away from the traditional 
exports more rapidly when depreciation is large.   
The downward slope of the IRCA in all of the figures implies that revealed 
comparative advantage today does not portend future trends in growth.  This is likely 
because the IRCA sectors have already matured, providing less room for rapid growth in 
the future. Export growth is largely due to strong growth of relatively small existing 
exports, and in developing countries, it is also due to growth of new products.  The more 
rapid decline in export share of the traditional sectors in countries with a larger 
depreciation is consistent with the idea that a more competitive currency facilitates the 
restructuring process. 
In sum, the graphs show more exploration of new products and markets, and more 
restructuring of trade away from traditional export sectors, during surges with more 
undervaluation in developing countries.  In developed countries, we also see more 
restructuring, but the extensive margin is less important.  Below, we control for other 
factors that could affect these results.  
 
  18Regression analysis 
To evaluate the robustness of these results, both for the episodes and more generally, we 
turn to regression analysis, which allows us to control for country and time effects that 
might be driving the results.  We use both the surge-country sample and a larger sample 
of all countries with available data from 1980 to 2005.  We create a panel of five 5-year 
periods in order to eliminate noise that may affect annual data and because exchange rate 
effects may take more than one year to appear.  Specifically, we consider the following 
relationship: 
it it t i nt misalignme X ε β γ γ + + + = ) ln( 0  
where γi is a country-fixed effect and γt is a period-fixed effect. X are the variables that 
may be affected by misalignment and depreciation, including ln manufacturing exports, 
ln entry and the failure rate.  We estimate all equations in first differences. 
(1)   it it t nt misalignme d dX ε β α + + = ) ln( 0  
The coefficient β0 reflects the effect of misalignment on the set of dependent variables 
that is not due to country-specific effects or global growth effects.  We report results for 
the set of countries with surges, and also using all countries for which data on 
misalignment are available (130 countries).  We also control for country size, trade 
liberalization, and ultimately country-fixed effects.  In this growth specification, country-
fixed effects will control for country-specific growth rates or, put differently, country-
specific trends in levels.      
  Simple correlations between the variables of interest are reported in Table 4.  The 
simple correlations confirm a positive correlation between the change in misalignment 
and export growth.  In addition, increased currency competitiveness is associated with 
  19less openness, more entries into new markets and products, and a lower failure rate.  In 
tables 5-7, we explore these relationships in more detail. 
  Table 5 examines the effect of the change of misalignment on entry into new 
products and markets (estimating equation 1).  The first column reports results for the 
sample of countries with surges.  We find that depreciation leads to higher entry growth, 
after controlling for period-fixed effects.  Column 2 shows results for the full sample.  
The effect of depreciation on entry is similar, implying that this is a robust finding—
depreciation tends to stimulate entry in all countries.  From here on we focus on the full 
sample in order to identify the effect of exchange rate movements on entry, which may be 
part of the mechanism through which large depreciations lead to surges in developing 
countries.    Column 3 includes openness and lagged GDP.  More open countries have 
higher entry growth as do smaller countries (presumably because larger countries are 
already in many markets already).  In column 4, we include country-fixed effects and 
while depreciation remains significant, openness and lagged GDP are no longer 
significant, suggesting that changes in size or openness within countries have little effect 
on entry growth.  The final two columns show results for developing and developed 
countries separately.  Increased currency competitiveness is only significant in boosting 
entry growth in developing countries.  In particular, a 10 percentage point increase in 
misalignment leads to 2 percentage point higher entry growth. 
  Table 6 reports similar results for the failure rate.  Greater currency 
competitiveness reduces the failure rate, but significantly only in the developing 
countries.  In contrast for developed countries, a move to openness or an increase in size 
  20has a larger effect on reducing the fail rate. The results imply that a 10 percentage point 
increase in misalignment leads to a 4 percentage point lower failure rate. 
  Table 7 examines the effect of the change in misalignment on export growth.  We 
also report results using the level of misalignment as an independent variable.  The 
argument for using the level is that a more competitive currency will be associated with a 
higher level of entry and a lower failure rate—as well as greater demand abroad—and 
thus potentially higher export growth.
17   Using both measures, we find that increased 
currency competitiveness leads stronger export growth (columns 1-4).  In column 5, we 
include both the change in misalignment and the level and find a stronger relationship 
with the level.  For this reason, we continue the analysis including the level of 
misalignment only. Column 6 includes country-fixed effects and the results are slightly 
stronger, implying that within countries, export growth is higher when the currency is 
more competitive.  Columns 7 and 8 report results for developing and developed 
countries, and results are only significant for developing countries.  In columns 9 and 10, 
we control of openness and the lagged level of GDP.  The effect of a competitive 
currency on export growth is strong and robust in developing countries.  It implies that a 





                                                 
17 We also try levels of misalignment in the regressions on entry and the failure rate.  Both had the same 
sign as for changes, but in both cases the larger and more significant effect was from changes.  This is 
intuitive since changes in misalignment will likely have a greater effect the growth rate of entries and the 
change in the failure rate.  In the case of export growth, a more competitive currency generates a higher 
level of entry and a lower failure rate, as well as greater demand, which will lead to higher export growth. 
  21VI.  Sustained export surges 
Does the undervaluation jump start the export surge, allowing countries to find new 
successful export products and markets, or is it a requirement for sustained strong export 
growth?  To answer this question we explore which of the 92 surges are maintained for at 
least 12 years.  Specifically, we identify those episodes where the export growth is 
sustained for at least 12 years (our original definition of export surge considers episodes 
of sustained growth during 7 years), using the same criteria utilized for the identification 
of the export surges, but extending the 7-year restriction to 12 years.
18 As a result, we 
identify 53 episodes with sustained export growth, of which 40 are in developing 
countries.  
  Using 68 comparable episodes for developing countries, we contrast the average 
and median of the exchange rate movement, misalignment, and exchange rate volatility 
for those episodes with sustained export growth for 12 years, vs. the average and median 
of all those variables for the unsustained episodes.  The sample is smaller because we 
examine only developing countries, and only episodes before 1996 which have the 
potential to last 12 years. 
  The top panels of Figure 15 show real exports and export growth for the sustained 
and unsustained episodes.  Sustained episodes have stronger export growth for a longer 
period, resulting in much higher exports on average.  The middle panels show movement 
in the real exchange rate and estimated misalignment.  The sustained episodes tend to 
maintain the depreciation, while there is a reversal in the unsustained episodes in the third 
year.  The sustained episodes have a large undervaluation (of about 25-30 percent) and 
                                                 
18 The restrictions to identify supply-driven surges and to avoid surges due to only one year of strong 
growth are absent because by using them to identify surges in the first place, we eliminated the possibility 
of having problems related to these two issues, regardless of whether the export growth lasts 7 or 12 years. 
  22maintain a competitive currency throughout the period.  In contrast, the large 
undervaluation in the unsustained episodes is short-lived and is substantially eroded after 
five years.  This implies that continued undervaluation is important to maintain strong 
growth.  Still, the unsustained episodes are able to maintain the higher level of exports 
they achieved as a result of the export surge.  There is hysteresis in the sense of export 
volumes not retreating after the exchange rate reverses; however, strong export growth 
does not persist.
19  Put another way, the competitive currency allows the countries to find 
new customers and new export products, and these new relationships survive even after 
the exchange rate reverts.  However, once the sale is over the country no longer continues 
to attract new customers or augment sales to old customers at such a high rate.  
  The sustained episodes are also associated with sustained strong and stable GDP 
growth.  In the unsustained episodes, GDP growth falls after the fifth year of the surge.  
In sum, the results suggest that sustained strong export growth requires sustained 
undervaluation in developing countries—at least for 12 years.  
 
VII.  Specific country cases 
In this section, we discuss in detail some of the specific country experiences with export 
surges.  In particular, we look at the experiences of China and Turkey, which are often 
described as export-led growth. We discuss Portugal, Spain, and South Africa, where 
regime changes led to increased integration with the rest of world.  We examine the debt 
crisis in the 1980s, the resulting devaluations and country experiences.  And, we look at 
                                                 
19 Baldwin (1988), Baldwin and Krugman (1989), and Dixit (1989) discuss the hysteretic effect of 
exchange rate changes on trade and import prices in the presence of sunk costs. 
  23the devaluation of the CFA (coopération financière en Afrique) franc that affected 
countries in Central and Western Africa.   
China and Turkey each experienced two episodes of export surges.  In the case of 
China, the currency has moved steadily from an estimated overvaluation of more than 50 
percent in the early 1980s to an estimated undervaluation of more than 50 percent in the 
mid 1990s.  In the case of Turkey, there has been more volatility, but each of the surges 
was accompanied by a large move (of about 40 percent) away from an overvalued 
currency to a more competitive level.  Both countries also liberalized trade and promoted 
manufacturing exports with tax incentives and subsidies.  Still, the exchange rate seems 
the dominant force in both countries.  In the case of Turkey, Arslan and Wijbergen 
(1993) examine the importance of import demand, domestic policies, and the exchange 
rate and find that by far the most important factor explaining export growth in the 1980s 
was the exchange rate.  For China, Rodrik (2007) also highlights the exchange rate as a 
key stimulant to exports and growth.  Wei and Dollar (2007) show that industrial policies 
in China have tended to channel resources to inefficient state owned enterprises, without 
which, China would likely have grown just as fast with lower investment and more 
consumption.   
In Portugal, Spain, and South Africa, the defeat of inward looking regimes led to 
more integration with the rest of the world and ultimately export surges.  The 
dictatorships of Salazar in Portugal and Franco in Spain kept these countries isolated 
from the rest of Europe until the early-mid 1970s.  Following, their deaths, the two 
countries moved towards integration with the West.  Negotiations for entry to the EU 
began in the late 1970s and both countries joined the European Community (EC) in 
  241986—the precise year of their export surges.  While their currencies were depreciating 
in the years up to 1985, they appreciated sharply as soon as it was clear they would enter 
the EC and continued to appreciate for the next several years—suggesting that 
depreciation did not play a major role in the surges.  In South Africa, apartheid was 
dismantled in 1990-91 and democratic elections took place in 1994.  The end of apartheid 
was rewarded with the removal of sanctions by the industrial countries that had been 
limiting exports.  The currency appreciated in the years leading up to the surge. While 
moderate depreciation accompanied the surge, strong export growth was likely more 
related to the regime shift and greater openness to South Africa’s exports in major 
markets.  
One noticeable feature of the data on export surges is that a number of developing 
countries experienced surges in 1986 or 1987.  This is not a coincidence.  The debt crisis, 
which started with Mexico’s default in 1982, led to large real devaluations in nearly all of 
the highly indebted developing countries on the order of 30 to 90 percent from the early 
1980s to 1986.  And these large devaluations resulted in export surges.  What is 
especially interesting in these cases is that because of the crises, trade liberalization 
initiatives were most often reversed.  Among the most drastic reversals were Argentina 
and Philippines, both of which experienced export surges.  In Argentina, non-tariff 
barrier coverage was low before the crisis; however, after it 62 percent of tariff lines had 
non-tariff barriers.  Similarly, in the Philippines, NTB coverage increased from 40 to 100 
percent of tariff lines.  In addition, because of increased exports from many developing 
countries, developed countries increased import barriers during this period (Laird and 
Nogues 1988).  This suggests that even when trade barriers are on the rise, a competitive 
  25exchange rate goes a long way to stimulate exports.  Laird and Nogues (1988) also 
highlight the effect of the depreciations on stimulating manufacturing exports in a 
number of the debt crisis countries—they find a 0.37 correlation between annual 
movements in the real exchange rate and manufactured exports.   
Finally, another group of countries where exchange rate depreciation loomed 
large in generating export surges is the CFA countries in Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Togo).  The CFA was created in December 1945 and it is 
the common currency of 14 African countries, members of the Franc Zone. The CFA was 
created with a fixed exchange rate versus the French franc and this exchange rate was 
changed only twice: in October, 1948 and in January, 1994. The devaluation of 1994 was 
preceded by the nominal appreciation of the French franc against the U.S. dollar, which 
in turn led to the deterioration of the countries’ competitive position. The 1994 
devaluation was significant in its magnitude (50 percent in foreign currency terms, or 100 
percent in domestic currency terms) and it was uniform across all the members of the 
Franc Zone (van den Boogaerde and Tsangarides, 2005; Devarajan, 1997).  The large real 
depreciation that accompanied the devaluation was the main reason these countries 
experienced export surges. 
Our work highlights a major role for a competitive currency in stimulating exports 
in developing countries. The case studies support this relationship—many of the surges 
occurred in the aftermath of a large devaluation or steady depreciation.
20  Regime shift 
                                                 
20 The industrialization of Latin America in the late 19
th century has also been attributed to depreciation and 
export-led growth.  Most of Latin America was tied to silver, which fell significantly in value relative to 
gold during the last two decades of the century.  Thus, their currencies depreciated with respect to gold-
backed North Atlantic economies.  See Haber (2005) for a detailed discussion. 
  26can also play an important role, with a move to more engagement with the rest of the 
world accompanied by increased exports. 
 
VIII.  Conclusions 
We find that a large depreciation, resulting in a 20 percent undervaluation, and reduced 
exchange rate volatility tends to precede export surges in developing countries.  
Moreover, countries with longer periods of sustained export growth have experienced 
relatively larger depreciations and continued undervaluation.  In contrast, countries where 
the surge fizzles after seven years tend to experience a reversal of the depreciation. 
  We highlight a new role for a competitive currency in generating export growth.  
In addition to stimulating exports along the intensive margin, the large undervaluation 
leads to more entry into new markets and a lower failure rate in those markets.  We argue 
that there is a distortion that leads to suboptimal entry in new markets and new products 
in developing countries.  The undervalued exchange rate is a useful tool to alleviate that 
distortion.  It is especially effective because it works across all export industries—it does 
not require the government to pick favorites. 
  The dominance of the exchange rate over trade policy may reflect the scarcity of 
large trade liberalizations in the data.  A real exchange rate depreciation of 20 percent 
gives a large and immediate boost to exporters. Trade liberalization tends to be variable 
across products and take place in smaller steps of 2 or 3 percentage points in a year.  In 
addition, while trade liberalization supports exporters it does not support tradables vis-à-
vis nontradables.  In contrast, real exchange depreciation moves resources out of import-
competing sectors into both the export sector and the non-tradable sector.  If the main 
  27issue is getting resources into the tradables sector, undervaluation may be more effective 
tool. 
An important concern is how and when to allow the currency more mobility.  Our 
results on sustained episodes suggest that the time line is more than 12 years.  The export 
successes that lasted for 12 years maintained an undervalued exchange rate throughout 
the period.  Still, eventually there will be costs to promoting tradables, as this sector will 
reach a point of diminishing returns.  In addition, there is a threat of disruptive inflation 
as the domestic economy strengthens (Eichengreen 2008).  As the manufacturing sector 
expands, and these costs become large as compared with their benefits, it will be time to 
change.  How long to pursue this policy and potential exit strategies remain an important 
area for future research. 
  Our work has important implications for recent demands that there is more global 
regulation of exchange rates.  With all eyes on China, a number of papers have argued 
that the use of policy to maintain an undervalued real exchange rate, which effectively 
serves as an import tariff and export subsidy, should be regulated by the IMF and/or 
WTO (Goldstein 2005, Mussa 2008, and Mattoo and Subramanian 2008).   Mattoo and 
Subramanian (2008), argue that the WTO would be a better enforcer with the IMF 
providing technical assistance.
21   
As this paper—in combination with the work of Hausmann, Prichett and Rodrik 
(2005)—shows, one of the most effective tools available to developing countries to 
improve income growth through trade is a competitive currency.  Stricter regulations and 
enforcement against undervaluation would thus prevent developing countries from 
                                                 
21 Even if the WTO had the authority over enforcement, Staiger and Sykes (2008) show that translating 
exchange rates into trade policy equivalents is very complex and unlikely to serve the interest of the trade 
system. 
  28following a path likely to produce income growth, a path that countries such as Japan and 
Korea have already taken.  Developing countries have repeatedly argued that the 
international institutions do not serve their interests.  Our results imply that regulations 
and enforcement on exchange rate management would strengthen that argument. 
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  32 Table 1: The Relationship between Export Surges and GDP Surges 
  Export surges 
(number of episodes) 
GDP surges 
(number of episodes) 
1. Countries experiencing both 
episodes within a 8-year period: 
33  33 
   - Both start at the same time  8 
   - Export happens before GDP   15 
   - Export happens after GDP  10 
2. Countries experiencing either just 
one type of episode, or both but with 
more than 8 years in between 
59  38 
Total number of episodes  92  71 
 
Table 2: Openness and Export Surges 
Percentage of Episode in Each Category 
 
Surge first Same Year Liberalization first Open Closed
18.67 6.67 14.67 36.00 24.00  
Note: Surge first indicates surge was 5 years or less before, liberalization first indicates that the 
liberalization was 5 years or less before. For 17 countries with surges (18.5  percent of sample), 




Table 3:  Openness in Surge Countries vs. Openness in Other Countries 
Percent of countries with surge Percent of countries without surge t-test
Closed in 1980 75.38 75 0.05
Closed in 2004 18.46 34.21 2.11
nob 65 76  
Note: t-test is a test of the difference in the means between countries with surge and without.
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Table 4: Correlations 
 







dlnentry 0.33*** 0.16*** -0.18***
0.00 0.00 0.00
520 520 404
dfail -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.04 -0.35***
0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00
520 520 404 520
* Significant at the 5 percent level.  ** Significant at the 5% level.  *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level.  
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Table 5: The Effect of the Change in Misalignment on Entries 
 
Surge Full Full Full Developing Developed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dmisalignment 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.12* 0.16** 0.18*** -0.27
[0.06] [0.04] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.44]
open 0.08** 0.09 0.09 0.27
[0.03] [0.10] [0.10] [0.59]
L.lngdp -0.05*** -0.14 -0.15 0.00
[0.00] [0.11] [0.12] [0.18]
Observations 292 520 300 300 213 87
R-squared 0.13 0.09 0.319 0.604 0.505 0.587
Country effects X X X
Dependent variable: dln Entry
* Significant at the 5 percent level.  ** Significant at the 5% level.  *** Significant at the 1 
percent level.
Period fixed effects in all regressions.  Errors adjusted for clustering at the country level.
 
  35Table 6:  The Effect of the Change in Misalignment on the Failure Rate 
 
Surge Full Full Full DevelopingDeveloped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dmisalignment -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.03** -0.04** -0.04** -0.07
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.08]
open 0 -0.02 -0.01 -0.17*
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.10]
L.lngdp 0 0 0.01 -0.08*
[0.00] [0.02] [0.02] [0.05]
Observations 292 520 300 300 213 87
R-squared 0.133 0.075 0.118 0.34 0.372 0.301
Country effects X X X
Period fixed effects in all regressions.  Errors adjusted for clustering at the country le
* Significant at the 5 percent level.  ** Significant at the 5% level.  *** Significant at 
the 1 percent level.
Dependent variable: dFailrate
  36Table 7: The Effect of Misalignment on Export Growth 
 
DevelopingDeveloped Developing Developed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
misalignment 0.18* 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.35** 0.34* 0.53 0.51* -0.14
[0.10] [0.06] [0.07] [0.17] [0.18] [0.44] [0.29] [0.46]






Observations 292 292 520 520 520 520 360 160 213 87
R-squared 0.044 0.046 0.066 0.049 0.069 0.385 0.397 0.338 0.426 0.619
Country Fixed Effects X X X X X
Dependent variable: dln Exports
Full Surge
Period fixed effects in all regressions.  Errors adjusted for clustering at the country level. * Significant at the 5 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5% level.  *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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  39Figure 3: Real GDP Growth, Real Consumption Per Capita, and Unemployment 
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Foreign Direct Investment, net Inflows (constant 2000 US$)
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Entries New Exports vs. Misalignment RER
 



































































































Failure Rate of Entries vs. Misalignment RER
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Entries New Exports by Change in Misalignment RER
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Failure Rate of Entries by Change in Misalignment RER
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  50Figure 14: Export Share of Initial Revealed Comparative Advantage (IRCA) 
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Share of Products with RCA in years -6 to -4




































-5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10
Sustained for 12 or more years Sustained for less than 12 years
median mean
surge_year











-5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10
Sustained for 12 or more years Sustained for less than 12 years
median mean
surge_year













-5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10
Sustained for 12 or more years Sustained for less than 12 years
median mean
surge_year





-5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10
Sustained for 12 or more years Sustained for less than 12 years
median mean
surge_year













-5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10
Sustained for 12 or more years Sustained for less than 12 years
median mean
surge_year







-5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10
Sustained for 12 or more years Sustained for less than 12 years
median mean
surge_year
GDP Growth (Annual %)
  52Appendix 
 
Table A1: Variables Description 
 
Variable   Name  Description  Source 
Consumer price index  cpiusa  CPI (base year:2000)  WDI 
Current Account Balance  currac_perc  Current account balance as 
percent of GDP 
WDI 
Failure Rate  failrate  Failure rate after 1 year  COMTRADE 
FDI inflows  fdi_inf, fdi_usd  FDI inflows as percent of GDP 
and in US$ (constant 2000) 
WDI 
GDP constant  gdp_cons  in US$ (constant 2000)  WDI 
GDP growth   gdp_gwth    WDI 
Gross Dom. Savings  sav_perc, 
sav_usd 
Savings as percent of GDP and 
in US$ (constant 2000) 
WDI 
Gross Dom. Investment  invest_perc, 
invest_usd 
Private investment as % GDP 
and in US$ (constant 2000) 
WDI 
Manufacturing Exports  exports  Real Exports (base year 2000)  COMTRADE 
Manufacturing Exports 
Growth 
dexpclc    COMTRADE 
Misalignment misalignment  RER observed – RER 
equilibrium 
PENN DATA 
Number of attempts  sumtry  New exports with respect to 








Expenditure per capita 
Pconsump_pcusd Consumption per capita in 
US$ (constant 2000) 
WDI 
Real Exchange Rate (RER)  reer  Based on a nominal rate 
adjusted for relative changes in 
consumer prices 
WDI 
RER Volatility  sdreer_ifs  Standard Deviation real 
exchange rate based on 
monthly calculations 
IFS 
Average Applied Tariff 
Rates 
tom   Tariff rates based on 
unweighted averages for all 
goods in ad valorem rates, or 
applied rates, or MFN rates 
whichever data is available in 
a longer period. 
Trade Research 
Department, 
World Bank (Data 
on Trade and 
Import Barrier) 
Unemployment unemp_tot_per  Unemployment, total (% of 
total labor force) 
WDI 
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Table A2: List of Export Surge Episodes  
 
Nr.   Country  Year=0 
1 Albania  1995
2 Angola  1987
3 Antigua  and  Barbuda  2000
4 Argentina  1986
5 Australia  1987
6 Austria  1986
7 Bahamas  1986
8 Bahrain  1988
9 Bangladesh  1987
10 Benin  1996
11  Bosnia and Herzegovina  2000
12 Brazil  2000
13 Burkina  Faso  1995
14 Cambodia  1991
15 Chile  1988
16 China  1986
17 China  2000
18 Colombia  1986
19 Colombia  2000
20 Congo,  Rep.  1989
21 Costa  Rica  1986
22 Costa  Rica  1997
23 Cyprus  1987
24 Dominican  Republic  1986
25 Ecuador  1991
26  Egypt, Arab Rep.  1987
27  Egypt, Arab Rep.  2000
28 El  Salvador  1987
29 Equatorial  Guinea  1994
30 Fiji  1986
31 Gambia  1987
32 Guatemala  1986
33 Guinea  1986
34 Guyana  1993
35 Honduras  1986
36  Hong Kong, China  1986
37 Hungary  1994
38 Iceland  1997
39 India  1987
40 Indonesia  1986
41 Ireland  1986
42 Ireland  1994
43 Israel  1986
44 Israel  1994
45 Jordan  1984
46 Jordan  1998
Nr. Country  Year=0 
47 Kenya 1989
48 Korea, Rep.  1986

























74 Saudi Arabia  1986
75 Seychelles 1998
76 Singapore 1986
77 South Africa  1994
78 Spain 1986
79 Sudan 1995
80 Syrian Arab Republic  1990
81 Thailand 1986
82 Togo 1994





88 United Arab Emirates  1988
89 United States  1987
90 Uruguay 1987
91 Venezuela 1988
92 Vietnam 1985 
Table A3: List of Export Collapse Episodes 
 
N.   Country  Year=0 
1 Afghanistan 1989
2 Bahamas, The  1994
3 Bermuda 1994
4 Bolivia 1985












  55Table A4: Number of countries included in the graphs of preconditions by development 
status and of sustained episodes  
 
Developed Countries Developing Countries Sust. for 12+ years Sust. less than 12 years
Manufacturing Exports (US$) 24 68 39 8
Manufacturing Exports (% GDP) 23 62
Manufacturing Exports Growth (% Annual) 24 68 39 8
Average Applied Tariff Rates (%) 5 30
GDP Growth (% Annual) 23 62 35 7
Private Consump. Expendit. per cap. (US$) 12 51
Private Consump. Expendit. (US$) 12 51
Total Unemployment (% Labor Force) 14 14
Real Effective Exchange Rate Index 18 28 17 5
Misalignment Real Effect. Exchange Rate 23 55 29 8
Volatility Real Effect. Exchange Rate 18 28 17 5
Manufacturing Exports (% Merchandise Xs) 18 34
Manufacturing Value Added (% GDP) 12 53
Current Account Balance (% GDP) 22 58
Gross Domestic Saving (US$) 22 60
Gross Domestic Investment (US$) 22 60
Foreign Direct Invest., inflows (US$) 20 59
Gross Domestic Saving (% GDP) 22 62
Gross Domestic Investment (% GDP) 22 63
Foreign Direct Invest., inflows (% GDP) 20 60
All episodes Sustained episodes (only Developing Countries)
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